Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1e664a9a78e9214…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.50 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-24
MD5: 641f4e13f745f21523103a4fa65e290a SHA-1: 2b6671196b4c25f4c7782fb78f3ac66c2d94ed1d SHA-256: e1e664a9a78e92148ef14f8205209c75af1d0e3f2503af25e200a236731166d3
332 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, links to an external URL. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0' suggests a downloader functionality, likely to fetch and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
9ab920764c86574de3754cc357c7e5b27240af257fad01cd55931d502311adc8		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000DA212/oLe10native 1600 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005c200.pdf
15066080ad5e5adf815d4ad76abbf4cee1712b34a49ae4953b41b44c871c8740		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5C200 1198080 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
06471f188ab04dd5de89b82bfb1c2ecd49d1567d8a4b4729b034265bae2d33d0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1570816 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
cc854a6d397d687dcde1b20329441cfd0328982fb340aef20ac8bdef7274be09		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1549312 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
c9b2ba9dfc20c7d1035fa199a22c22582e131f6e7585f4292e917875fcdb0c5b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1473024 bytes

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