Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1c65253212ac1e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

50.9 KB First seen: 2023-08-03
MD5: e29430f973a27719574ae320d4a59007 SHA-1: 9044c6519fae2eee86217b9b6fcbf0940b11ae1b SHA-256: e1c65253212ac1e1b683e0fe76bdf5c166f6dae6dadf294a31784637f81ea259
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a vulnerability in the Equation Editor, as indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is necessary to trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object likely contains a secondary payload or exploit code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003473.bin
009c1bdc306db06ef1a8aa78316ac1440ac9a024cdff60b107c27d1112e2d846		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3473 1754 bytes

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