Valyria — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1c09e045af8b730…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

41.7 KB Created: 2022-09-21 08:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-10-12
MD5: 00e6f597354d69cdad7ea5deeb3c6857 SHA-1: 6df41b52409cd12be73dc46b6adcac83d008ede4 SHA-256: e1c09e045af8b7301390cd9619e3cca7a96d9d2bba2b5fc3385a093f3d69b6b4
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Valyria · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution function, indicative of a downloader. The script uses CreateObject to execute a PowerShell command that downloads and runs a second-stage payload from a constructed URL. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0' strongly suggests the Valyria family.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4dfbf4132831cad8ad06a4238935be7453220ccda018ea85a6c04128b00d2250		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8846 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
382ae82c4096146ac23fc2b47de640f3692b105c307bce51230c7a54ac5870ad		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 47104 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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