Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e1aa8f50e4695c27…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

16.6 KB
MD5: ab361a7b3d4f59de51e8b1fb9f986840 SHA-1: 1746dd03d2f1706ea8689456e2ac38e0c2a42ef0 SHA-256: e1aa8f50e4695c2744f140821d9b67f19cdeda6830cbc09c25d522be7ddb5a4e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and OLE object activation. This indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely within the Equation Editor component, to execute arbitrary code. The embedded OLE object data is a strong indicator of a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000b26.bin
5eb430f5e9ae8dcec9c1515ab9a30cf09ace41acc1434b3a94da80b463f2f70b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB26 1898 bytes