Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e19f808874cc997c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.6 KB Created: 2021-01-19 09:16:10 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 67669a4e8133de77cf09ca32ff52b19a SHA-1: 1f3ffa8fabcde4fb60bf5e98a473da9e9beb4439 SHA-256: e19f808874cc997c4fc911f11b0b15fa432ef8878b2e3f2922ccb73489ca23c4
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of techniques used to lead users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/123?utm_term=the+pancake+house+quill+city+mall PDF link annotation
    • https://buralekareze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134326789/tanebetabosuxavimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/kajesonujizowujepawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wugumelejemumaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135324079/2639334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://metuliwilive.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134386481/rutepunukerufewiwek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wezalowesugalu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815960/bowititofenebib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454679/normal_5fa4e52350ca5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guvujuxedudekef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164066/3319180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://warobakun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486798/a45d9986e7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kodetinerimaguw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347088/vumofobur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goponubinolofuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134695307/wikolatezonuxibereri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuwebiwurumebil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164488/wosunaxuzokeni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xejukogafowoje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682905/57c0ce6730c1f9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bupaxomu/pinujave.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lezopobigeza/ximadelazalaruxoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ef62.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF62 5320 bytes
SHA-256: 94cda150c2b198c49553d601ac0a7e51082db2db24e7f0c461aa4dad70d0dec8
font_01_sfnt_off0001015c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1015C 4656 bytes
SHA-256: 14ddd6062fa548bbbd136d2bc3bd972352dc92528bd4648a53b4d0741cf640e5
font_02_sfnt_off000112be.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x112BE 11248 bytes
SHA-256: d06d4d12a8c861052bc49063999ee76c71d76ab54e6d5677df01ad5519e1e193
font_03_sfnt_off00013932.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13932 17044 bytes
SHA-256: 5dfde65dff04430c41344ee15ecfb6aec5572b560b2a0a7ce6e52ed7b001ae0d

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