Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e18dba36937fde87…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.1 KB Created: 2020-08-16 22:45:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 3b9d59a6e02656d503940ee04d640bc0 SHA-1: 847a5f089decf402dcc6ea311e83c3ae7adf699d SHA-256: e18dba36937fde871a6cd5fb9b610f14723c7ac2c4d61f32dabd20b5fbc82112
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text referencing 'Base64 to pdf swift 4' and includes the malicious URL. This suggests the document is designed to trick users into visiting the redirector, likely leading to further malicious content or downloads.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=base64+to+pdf+swift+4
    • http://waselati.countryhides.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814526/jexatutavugemafad.pdf
    • http://files.belantine.com.au/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695391/winurepu-riramanogat.pdf
    • http://sakapesug.k-eleven.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/9107046.pdf
    • http://sepudup.rileyannsound.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381078/2605ffc055b15b.pdf
    • http://files.stjoespdr.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814085/987d9636f64.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3316/5986/files/14037939043.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2324/4191/files/dolafirisuliburewiwapijam.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9250/6779/files/cage_questionnaire.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7202/7814/files/wodexes.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0718/0954/files/catfish_farming_business_plan.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4398/7361/files/huffingtonpost._com_section_politics.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5757/8138/files/destiny_2_prima_official_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1690/3080/files/the_crooked_man_poem.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005878.bin
43d089ec2cf2cf31b2c58906a34755bdd49bde4a0bd936a13f5bddc089bd196d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5878 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006a9a.bin
2ae1afcfef2605d3669e7a55845fe9ba4d9aaf0f8d14006d94c6cf5e5645ef25		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A9A 4624 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00007735.bin
3377180f276c3a30f27f2fd2692572d0b0d847b6c82463211ad5c9e2e5a8e612		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7735 11496 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00009ec1.bin
9559dd1bd908241551916101fda3d445a26f5c4b506a1423f23393456f9d5940		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9EC1 16036 bytes

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