Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e149b165aee49681…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.6 KB
MD5: 9ca2e59713235378dbc18e131d5f1ede SHA-1: 4a25affaa6e36741a614289888b274cd0503bf11 SHA-256: e149b165aee4968116eb8cea34cf296493890f13f2b82ddc10a98be052f1cc90
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers an Equation Editor exploit. The \objupdate directive forces the OLE object to activate, leading to code execution. While no specific malware family is identified, the exploit method is clear.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000015c1.bin
17e384381238bee485b424a2da915fc5607e03bec43633f12294eb5e75e2d8c8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15C1 1936 bytes