Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e13fa200c0b2ac9c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

163.6 KB Created: 2009-07-28 12:46:19 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 9.0 Word 版 (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0)
MD5: 16a9f340c0d353332ba6f525376c93e1 SHA-1: bf1dda63ee7c947d20e8ce600d92c4cfa0aacdef SHA-256: e13fa200c0b2ac9c9f2c722b261ca881a7bee277014ca6e85cff5db3941d6643
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a PDF file flagged by ClamAV as 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-1633', indicating a known exploit. High severity heuristics indicate the presence of RichMedia (Flash) and an embedded file, both common vectors for exploit delivery. The ML classifier also flagged the PDF as malicious. The document body is heavily obfuscated and unreadable, providing no direct clues to the lure, but the combination of exploit detection and embedded rich media strongly suggests an attack pattern focused on exploiting PDF vulnerabilities to execute embedded content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.6130

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-1633 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-1633
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtin

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
b.swf
70e6dbce3b11aaece2d38f1d315dee7736c7ab9138a74cdadc8126393c857018		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 2 at offset 0x272E3 781 bytes
a.swf
257b38b73bb7bcfdd2a38ddeda0673fef573372a42e34e3d1f33e49435d5ef32		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 3 at offset 0x27620 8038 bytes
icc_00_off0002427d.icc
653b586c4707574ffcd648ba35494daed2c76ceafcf4c07d315ed961b1dc347f		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2427D 408 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000243aa.bin
5bae21d6090f59a30136388865be4af1db24de6e621999b893f7c87caa7c43c4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x243AA 26096 bytes

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