Malware Insights
The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by multiple heuristic firings including PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS. The 'PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_HEX_EVAL_STAGER' heuristic suggests that the annotation subject is used to decode and execute a stager. The extracted JavaScript artifacts, such as 'javascript_obj0004_000.js', 'numeric_charcode_stage_000.js', and 'legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js', likely contribute to downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The exact nature of the payload is not discernible from the provided evidence, but the overall mechanism points to a downloader.
Heuristics 6
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Annotation subject hex-decoded eval stager critical PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_HEX_EVAL_STAGERPDF OpenAction JavaScript decodes a decimal char-code launcher, enumerates annotation subjects with syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots(), turns dash-delimited hex bytes into JavaScript with String.fromCharCode(), and evals the staged result. This is an exploit-kit delivery pattern and not normal PDF form logic.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODEString.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
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syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCANPDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0004_000.jsb8afb5a7ba8b476ad5f84dd9a65b418dfd42876e85210804f937d30afffac798 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 4 at offset 0x2B7 | 1858 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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numeric_charcode_stage_000.js4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d |
deobfuscated-js | numeric char-code string decoded JavaScript at offset 0x2C7 | 469 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js0be39620d4258796ba3cea710099e4c6d711c0df8649cf2af9224d7fb3ffb576 |
deobfuscated-js | repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1B4F | 11963 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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