Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e115b5012d0af195…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB
MD5: c593518aaf11930cdded9b127bbfef9a SHA-1: bd7c08f47ce472e603b52380747d890f6e05bb83 SHA-256: e115b5012d0af195bcc2c97ffca7a5df892848f1aa330a9f5cc4af875d2e0e32
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object heuristics, including automatic linking and updates, indicating it's designed to execute embedded content. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. No specific scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure strongly suggests a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
6c046152b21b7ceceaea9165a303ac440b03e5dee3ed461ba45717bfaba1489f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 79784 bytes
objdata_01_off00007114.bin
646491509038bb674c8ab4f0cc27675e282d04b4deb54cfc75f806ac505724ce
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 79757 bytes
objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E 12297 bytes