Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e11267997a1f7dc8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.12 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-18
MD5: 3a2fe2aa681adcaba9ee7bd90e595943 SHA-1: 29a9057171ab37b738a34abd2d9414e994e7c0f7 SHA-256: e11267997a1f7dc89e641638c9fdab1ca22cfc2a44f4d057adaab016c5641638
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

The file is an Excel document containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload that includes a direct link to an external resource. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques, suggesting an attempt to conceal its malicious nature and deliver a further stage.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0bedd32ea8c7bec8ef74cc8e5bea59e33d01f9a02d0a98c97ddecca9bc6aa980		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1812 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
57ad3be29c95414496922941fcc56722288287753f3e6e913bca0d1094104ae7		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0018DF61/OLE10NATIVe 1316 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00061e00.pdf
408d8cf6c836b32c72a31dada3b0c34bef8738ef56ee87807957cc57151b5ec6		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x61E00 772608 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
1507b1103be25656406d56b3617565f0fef44efea203eacd2804fad4c6b534b8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1168896 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
6869b94badfba1ee0a22213fdc9a6dc8b189fa3993d37a2e5bec521116452ad0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1147904 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00016000.pdf
fcf5544ad81ad0bc2c5c3d89a741f71c62bc5e901109a192cd411675aaa1d043		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x16000 1083392 bytes

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