Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e10ee4f3420f1298…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: 62a3ad2e234b9b3a74c23db4f6adae2d SHA-1: d5b774bd8377f1c2cc26500989059d7c0a16c3a1 SHA-256: e10ee4f3420f1298d05f24cbdbdb3c89c2eb951762b61777e90aa388652d1b3e
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJAUTLINK heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bf.bin
7200774209e0dc7691e67be49bd9997eea5aa5804b89cf5da1a3b05839859027
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF 1460 bytes