Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0fb306b7126a29c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

458.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-06-11
MD5: ed14dfa47c1f5bb1146f2eb2632f6f67 SHA-1: 5ef6e6d9dff33bfdac52659c371d6c854876ffd1 SHA-256: e0fb306b7126a29cd3306f70eeb158b2ad174e6c728f29f593d0b23363cc9908
226 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Equation Editor shellcode downloads a second-stage payload critical OLE_MTEF_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    The shellcode reached by the Equation Editor overflow resolves download/exec APIs and fetches a second-stage payload. The URL was recovered by emulating the shellcode's self-decoding stub; an integer-encoded host (e.g. http://000030000706151) is normalised to its dotted-quad form and both spellings are surfaced.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL hTTp://172.245.209.218 In document text (OLE body)
    • hTTp://00000025475350732In document text (OLE body)
    • http://000030000706151In document text (OLE body)
    • http://192.3.140.105Decoded from obfuscated IP host (000030000706151)

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD024A993D/oLE10NATiVe 1844 bytes
SHA-256: 826d7ae3baca05235a84403526d6ab751f038d194cc1758cb169173737a80ed1
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 464896 bytes
SHA-256: b703d1d59a5d6f6dceeaebd076ab5844afa50041af36268a2be0952c24eff5ae
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018200.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18200 370176 bytes
SHA-256: 739cb844c0040b39f72d0b6b58b6c3d919bf9d1497f256c351b72c9b75ed0f87
polyglot_child_pdf_off00025800.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x25800 315392 bytes
SHA-256: 4499e3f699224228ab44267079b3efbf89a2253849ca6701f637871c9e28dd7e
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003c800.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x3C800 221184 bytes
SHA-256: f5835e7f1d5e0d744a794172d04e1fe680d2dbd7628626ed2bb32c9052e53786

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