Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0f54af0676d513d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

603.9 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: bbf73897f9f7fb54d9a5ae5a2ceae251 SHA-1: 1feaed6a7a837fba3524e522db013ce5913d0036 SHA-256: e0f54af0676d513d0a42a362e8cc0f64eed62ad34651c84af7942dc899e2351e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically triggering the Equation Editor CLSID. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759 via MSXML SAX OLE activation, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJUPDATE suggests the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the core attack vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00090a1b.bin
bb2548760af0347478203141bd9a7694b54e2db1e8e37289fb1b92902f2d1dbe		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x90A1B 3739 bytes

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