Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0f467c0b2ce7665…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.5 KB Created: 2021-06-10 07:49:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1daca7a90b1a92cd6e3400bcea3d2e84 SHA-1: 71364639084c295ad33e73894b840d621bb0ba89 SHA-256: e0f467c0b2ce76658c8a91b044348a77d937a9e656f696fb1c6d8a7b49ca2d13
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple links to external resources, many hosted on compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports this, indicating a lure to download a payload. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the overall structure and URL patterns are consistent with malware delivery. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ds+emulator+android+apk
    • https://makemycake.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tvan4ra3g2926vfli85ugeq5qk/56189978127.pdf
    • https://adm.allianceflooring.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8184eb5b705d4ff5c414c3a76b6950f9/38077352598.pdf
    • https://glowskincare.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b7414632221591334f5f8a9510b6cdb5/57375237008.pdf
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e3e1a3ee8d---vomujelaledovemodawipub.pdf
    • https://wecafephuket.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/gcmvtqusvfbfjmusf626sd1lvu/80090003394.pdf
    • http://chagatea.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/82e6492888df4f29ca44a4fa3dae43fa/natadawaje.pdf
    • http://portalcom-b2b.es/img/user///file/_0470626001620586912.pdf
    • https://jclifeschools.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d4a33b845a79f52a7fde55a6c0b60831/75547335227.pdf
    • https://golf-tout-terrain.com/publish/page/file/3327345681.pdf
    • https://wills.sg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c163ebf2e4de3dcd240430f8531eff5e/89840619500.pdf
    • https://monocroma.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5900fc9c6ee047a401920b0d2c0c30a8/kofozogeguresejodagafoker.pdf
    • https://rhagro.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f384c04abe69764eafd67458c69fe64e/58946800349.pdf
    • http://tano-cable.com/d/files/zoresavusifuxepawexapasu.pdf
    • http://pansophers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b28b779c7b3---dujitiviriz.pdf
    • https://legacyltg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/28ef50a1186d78c933a1d86a460979aa/8844435797.pdf
    • https://yourlightingbrand.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f225e711f180809a2f19741351c13115/nidibejozaguzemivulo.pdf
    • http://augustaelectricalwork.com/editorData/file/94021624079.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e399.bin
104c48b8698b5d472478e81bc04fba7f714ef8afb7d30642a667b1730c4815d9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE399 5168 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f518.bin
8391c0a88c5bceca73c51b8d40b8c42633f2c39f915f7571465a8bf3033b151e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF518 10592 bytes