Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0ebfeaed1fe5983…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

113.3 KB Created: 2020-06-22 11:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: b49348bf8ac4cd697e88eb6e7c7dcfef SHA-1: 3232195d0c4ed3b4669e77b7ce5ef9358dd17137 SHA-256: e0ebfeaed1fe5983410275db0e2f75ee109873f11a22bd1bb1ac23f7f65140b0
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The heuristics indicate suspicious extracted artifacts and script execution terms. While no specific payload or URL was directly extracted, the presence of the Document_Open macro strongly suggests the intent to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d05f894ebd856617c60000fe88b160a61f30bd10808056b1e3756c9220e40c6e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4532 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
7b2ab2d72dfa615ae0c86baf06ea4017eee569c385cd1edefe394cb7c190dd78		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 34304 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 16 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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