Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0d45b5eae5f677b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.55 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-24
MD5: e96135f0915bc55ccfd39e55b78d1bb0 SHA-1: 823abf2adef89f261492cc4fe4e7dc2ff4f9aea5 SHA-256: e0d45b5eae5f677bbd3be2bf0898ff166cc729307ffe14a743353c5632866ba9
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object is configured to deliver a secondary PDF payload. The PDF itself contains a direct link to an external resource, indicating a multi-stage attack designed to download and execute further malicious content. No VBA macros were found to be executable.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
16e84a3eaecff34503bedec975ba800b7d66c8ba72814ba4385c9cdc5a297a7f		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000308CA/OLE10NaTIvE 1840 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00007f7d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F7D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009d95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9D95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
22d32962ee9d70697250715a517dfc8c523dae201eeac5052279d56f45c2ee38		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1618432 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
d18118aa09071a6d4baf4011742ba6b7757c198d7a7179fe4d0f86c7a6ab4ee3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1597952 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
53a79963702924077c93eda644410f72d0a33ad630107cb6a664721aded59dff		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1564160 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00023e00.pdf
6b46cb109ea8cdc980ec5a026950207411246533c8c4bf230c46fd02589c6d7d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x23E00 1476096 bytes

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