Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e0a4a4a1ea4730e7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

67.6 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: b95b10d69fa8ae0ff010bb1da0f64e04 SHA-1: af14ee2998cd8ca12fffd2ce32fe5ece2c674e90 SHA-256: e0a4a4a1ea4730e70b5982b8af756c59849ade4f41cc30ffe4ece8d95a8deb16
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits a suspicious command-line invocation of cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This, combined with the OLE slack anomaly and embedded URLs, suggests the file is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The PEB access heuristic further supports the possibility of evasion or malicious code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 69,182 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 44,617 bytes (64%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pdf-repair.com
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/Producer(Advanced
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/ModDate(D:20100406171120+08
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/