Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e091e52c69a50faf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.3 KB Created: 2020-10-11 00:05:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: a2cde71bb9e89c0d20ff229c03446432 SHA-1: 7ea369acf912ea2eb8a8d66f86603588ebab53ad SHA-256: e091e52c69a50faf165c2ab71cbf35e1011075d35247901f1b1cae98e1e4526c
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=the+pirate+fairy+full+movie+in+hindi+dubbed In PDF document text
    • http://jijirofag.beyondprocess.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407469/mugopefa-welonasifaremad-vazeretozav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bradshaw2012.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379253/katiw-jeruti-gijukesakexes-renebevizekili.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.patriciacarriganartist.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681517/vawopepuwudegab-xakoluwo-xubedul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thewackywitchcupcakecandlefactory.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739143/053ebd4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dobizaso.australianupholstery.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738568/179fdee25d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.3haivhmoob.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813770/411196.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lujofu.getfitsd.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696063/puzisifijupijadij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/2746/3833/files/37611397643.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/8985/7174/files/nothing_else_matters_drum_tab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0270/7615/files/wenewawipivori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6886/7231/files/93428610807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/9954/0641/files/cases_-_tutorial_a_cis_3000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0576defa-9a74-49a2-adb3-1bdd8511c6ad/jomiwuxalawekovotuwolati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9a1e6a50-75e5-4fe5-b838-fb181f69e331/vixedapejal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6440f177-17b2-4e69-80ba-2649be25a459/84591767450.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000059ad.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x59AD 5352 bytes
SHA-256: c72cf570ee354a915a46a63089c88f574d7168c128e4866e9e3546224c12bba5
font_01_sfnt_off00006bc8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BC8 10732 bytes
SHA-256: a21c12e7bfdcdb43726a564dd232d26806fdc7ac44a9af3005990f1f72f487ef

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