Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e07a7606c871b754…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.7 KB Created: 2021-05-30 14:49:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-25
MD5: 3d4b255e50d4a3dd92b16bccb74109b9 SHA-1: ce086a7ed244e6c202ab6b2212b3b57f1b5cfe18 SHA-256: e07a7606c871b754fbf9df5c98346a98839d690b4d08a0bec8d7839b93262343
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high probability of malicious intent. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests the document may be part of a multi-stage attack involving password-protected archives, a common tactic to evade initial security scans.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://leonvi.ru/strik?utm_term=artificial+neural+network+in+machine+learning+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://raputaluwim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606275/6727356.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nejalebemenogun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070187/suvewepa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rokojilezel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302907/lijibubusif-bogafile-tatugizojevi-xejozagam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://voteweze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346586/8784109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pelozaxuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680784/4782432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mujunuduxur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327440/6644391.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vefotufujipewux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134401009/lirudotodopak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lokedidige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315074/4989775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vimujagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134306096/23b000bdef5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gedenotovet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379555/308385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xugugizebe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482894/kutinukurona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jitolubupiloz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134637312/tinoxonopewuzewoxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kujakaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347331/suwegekogaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xowetigebunagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637365/zesotuvo_bazexidamuxu_lenonezabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesaxewotivaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134578523/3886531.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pumaxodevuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872084/5117163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://paweweribawu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134656346/1623569.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lugivizukur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871894/3197d1d6d5f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fosisejabevenot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135398983/c457b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dawubatumov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134478144/2298840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ebb2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBB2 5536 bytes
SHA-256: 6cd0172dcb1015b62b680f4d0ed360e58e6361fe9dafcfe2ad8da139635e782b
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe74.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE74 11328 bytes
SHA-256: 5cef8972406ca8be1e84bd33ba85a15ce7c290dcd9a955e57888350fa683d4af

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