Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e06735da95f2d4ea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

304.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-26
MD5: 165f7287f9b9cb4b029e10621677900a SHA-1: 11d7130e8928cadcba9bd2596ea3071d81db47f0 SHA-256: e06735da95f2d4ea5c7234849668bd27ee635f3255dc179d3f49933e6f76401d
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote file. The embedded URL 'http://103.133.104.112/pj/pjpjpjpjp%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23pjpjp.doc' is indicative of a downloader. Although the VBA macros themselves contain no executable statements, the OLE structure and the CVE-2017-0199 heuristic strongly suggest malicious intent to fetch and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.133.104.112/pj/pjpjpjpjp%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23pjpjp.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
ea7ccc299228fe0e74b528d543acfba8911aaba7600ee5343e943051370e721a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 240640 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf
62ded63725e1e803e8bff4b0dd5dec681015646c0b49ffbdb5e17d092efe0800		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00 222208 bytes

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