Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e06317d5fbe5be0d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2021-07-31 00:48:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: b647cb1c3ca45b6abe0566fde3b2785f SHA-1: 18ed37bac4113986bbfa40ed55a3f9e8e99c9933 SHA-256: e06317d5fbe5be0da22c2e33414a231437a6203d940af9ed51f3a55f1641df40
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The presence of multiple PDF_URI heuristics further supports the attack pattern of directing users to external, potentially malicious, resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9989

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.heainc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5d65550404---1802054537.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://ecohort.com/userfiles/files/lupiwowinukadoxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://archltginc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cd475f85ae87ca925e65bc36d07f6fa4/33307653055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cordovajewelry.com/images/file/23315302114.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://myarchitect.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6629799692.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grandp.ru/userfiles/file/novisotodidulewofam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sity-luxe.ru/userfiles/file/luzenawutalovomepebododem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://3dreamstudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/024b7e05262e2098be848e8070c5719d/73394873513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tantex.org/tantex/tantexuserfiles/file/11974266344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wisdomtours.net/upload/file/jabarifikivulibunarigobew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.viksexteriors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089022c3d93b---7571558165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paymentsbusiness.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b3449b1db5b---nibisixatuwuvim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drthchowdary.net/userfiles/file/79440620253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://controlcert.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609877c35651d---22536144748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balaji-technology.com/userfiles/file/genobuzez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://82.79.55.12/ckfinder/userfiles/files/1140265865.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://www.sahabatkeluargahomecare.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077c54432fa3---43775835427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://big-cash.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vara29mu6f5shbhkfefl3jdrfi/83438153762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tamker.hu/userfiles/file/kotukavopinoboxar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://icbacademy.com/upload/files/bawekizel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://finpacecuador.com/userfiles/file/jijiketif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://friluftsgruppen.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160890d681af1f---41276195204.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noks.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a959bd27617---malivewomigogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://corghialberti.it/file/84228066179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://martonelektro.hu/files/file/jisisufiluberofotox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=what+is+the+server+address+for+bedwars+practicePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ffa4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFA4 10852 bytes
SHA-256: e497381416f88f7390a70ecfa6903f18578aaf3b5adaf64d08bb9f28f2a616f1
font_01_sfnt_off000118b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118B4 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000130c6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x130C6 18712 bytes
SHA-256: 2325241da3afed3ea3e9e60cf17fc041e3d523f2c479a6dcf7c25491f69d7565