Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e01799240ef4417d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

17.3 KB First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: bb619e80537642fa06dc1e43db96684f SHA-1: dfe346e64af300a2654300f3c1fa2dfdeef0434f SHA-256: e01799240ef4417d1c11385f27596bc1ca7195bab096bd472ef9f316a9c28809
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, which is known to be used to execute arbitrary code. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and run a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001425.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1425 1657 bytes
SHA-256: 1fc44cf3f09da014241322cc3d6b499df748d2d6956ee57fc1b79829a4b2f890

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