Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e00d0795913f70c6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.1 KB
MD5: db32b0c156355ad8516ff78f89ae62b4 SHA-1: 2e159a1c0b291b5e058e238cf4a81d8c7c61a64c SHA-256: e00d0795913f70c6b4c955e8b7c1285cc8374c3a5b265402628ff411c05c4740
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
98703e25d01ee4a463d91b360a6ee687bc3eb782e7005835f5c6125d575a3245
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1370 bytes