Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e006527fb04fd9c7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2021-09-21 03:19:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 4d061400ee60fd5547b594f51184b0b1 SHA-1: dde67d6c20ca300ab20a0475bc9fdbc993abc509 SHA-256: e006527fb04fd9c72165f4abd9737b90d62c638898fa66fd3dceedbb0f90a6ce
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories and disposable hosting, suggesting it functions as a link farm to distribute further malicious content or phish users. The presence of embedded URLs and the overall structure point towards an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities or trick users into visiting malicious sites, likely via a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9965

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://lcd96.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/518f9d7dbde67636c1d39006f640a8a1/16754925082.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://grawerlik.pl/userfiles/file/36240956802.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wilsonbarrera.com/inicio/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613ef4aaad3e3---26369157416.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.displaysdirectaustralia.com.au/application/third_party/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18461816201.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://magerp.org/upload/files/vobawanodenoladurer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://998.geektic.com/geektic/files/39541580313.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn----0tbbbfo0f.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/fisitemuduzizenataruxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--pssa17sw71b.tw/upimages/files/xunajetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vytvarnyobchod.cz/UserFiles/File/gazonikalikomaneme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://refundsrefunds.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161338ed519a5f---radazanivejesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://certifiedmoversinc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e8cd25d79fa46d8312254cfcbfeee17f/fubil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--oy2b19v1mb1yi.com/userfiles/file/totajolegaguginufosas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fsnmmaterials.com/UPFILE/userfiles/files/63426751474.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hkwwta.org/userfiles/potizifubijilo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pes.edu.mn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/84288578142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://211.129.1.225/system/ckfinder/userfiles/files/niwajagevavakewela.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://anhuizpyy.com/upload_fck/file/2021-9-21/20210921051248558642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bandungmesin.com/file/7139518026.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rosebankprimary.co.za/inc/ckfinder/userfiles/files/69479543423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitycountscleaning.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ea518851bbca3a1ed175ef5a1cfe46e5/86726383719.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://josephfellerlaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/futew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://trongtrucsolution.com/uploads/files/dagafuwepifatejaxojudi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ylpcl.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pubirisetexojuzomomarunus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lex.tj/img/file/16477612301.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hzxf.com/images/upload/File/nobajikek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=which+country+has+the+second+longest+coastline+in+the+worldPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b46d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB46D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000cc84.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC84 10940 bytes
SHA-256: 30a0ff43c9ee373aa4a7e3077c0025ed58bf1ed8c1d956dc348e185a5134ed27
font_02_sfnt_off0000e5b2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5B2 14928 bytes
SHA-256: 1c105a182cbe04b2b555536b86f44454e97a1211bc79161cc6dcb0c10276b0e0

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