Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfe48a1682340c20…

MALICIOUS

RTF

37.3 KB Created: 2017-10-25 12:39:00 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: f6ab26f720c3506858a8a2931a989526 SHA-1: 70013051dda30594f505249cd02b1ee0b570e489 SHA-256: dfe48a1682340c20e8c14685d89834126066c76c436b73b1339ae767c5bc3c58
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object that is configured to automatically update and activate. This behavior is indicative of an exploit targeting CVE-2017-0199, which allows for the download and execution of remote content. The embedded URLs point to external resources that likely host the secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-0199 (OLE2Link / remote URL Moniker) critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    RTF contains a URL Moniker OLE link whose decoded target is remote. Office can fetch and process the response through the CVE-2017-0199 OLE2Link attack path, but the server-side content type is not proven statically.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
    • https://doc-10-68-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/729nt2gkvif4mgcddka61lvd1r9m6mu7/m7pagkfr3gqm30c1jvn5udi354met6cf/1508918400000/14841952751346404657/14841952751346404657/0B00cgwa76EksdE9hRjZtZWIyT00?e=download&nonce=bltr96u4stpoq&user=148419527In RTF body
    • https://doc-10-68-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/729nt2gkvif4mgcddka61lvd1r9m6mu7/m7pagkfr3gqm30c1jvn5udi354met6cf/1508918400000/14841952751346404657/14841952751346404657/0B00cgwa76EksdE9hRjZtZWIyT00?e=download&nonce=bltr96u4stpoq&user=14841952In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002957.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2957 4738 bytes
SHA-256: 70c84c58b4aa30f5774e6bcec99e937644a7df94555fc063af3537f080eb2cea

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