Hancitor — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfdf79d355c1098d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

322.0 KB Created: 2020-11-19 12:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 06ba06269873237b18c23a82da59f492 SHA-1: d18f046a0fdbefb79ec85a22404e402e6e56f2bf SHA-256: dfdf79d355c1098d4cceaf4591200d35000ad86a585df727b3e7e6cf7dd58e95
660 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is configured to execute a shell command, which likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload from the embedded PE executable. ClamAV detections confirm this is a Hancitor variant, a known downloader.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d656d7ed79165651454fb1e871cd5ab280646db1f74a42c5655e67fc6a8fb77d
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2851 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
embedded_office_00022e9c.exe
bfb1a484a1fe5a0b08dce334028e91319853685f7dc94eac1bfaa4f6959a4385
embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x22E9C 186724 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Keylogger.Cridex-9807692-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
2cb1f3def1a775b3f13f4b03eb37819c6a5f97f5a4e6b5880ba7e279d297d2e3
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1667265592/Ole10Native 160182 bytes