Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfdd85d6f8d23fe8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.5 KB Created: 2021-04-15 07:45:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e23d8345358ae3b8f9d6f99fbbc126cc SHA-1: 7cd988e0ce0275dcb3517b4a19786f5bec8741e6 SHA-256: dfdd85d6f8d23fe83b7a4f5987848e25961b1e4a77aed394395d4c810144cc63
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for distributing further payloads or leading users to phishing sites. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous embedded URLs point towards a malicious document designed to redirect users.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/strik?utm_term=underground+mining+methods+handbook+hustrulid+pdf
    • https://sibibogug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135990875/d47fe99d.pdf
    • https://xepebujusu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319702/aaee067.pdf
    • http://teachersaid.fun/tetepejoferiwuxgk3xa.pdf
    • http://chambrely.xyz/60011201673s4sal.pdf
    • https://gumevuwogixuxuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317748/muresulotuvelosutil.pdf
    • https://kexowepapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815076/8710211.pdf
    • https://dorewedekubur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134721360/rimanenoxiz.pdf
    • https://dezazobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134755526/pivubu_daxose.pdf
    • http://matteset-spon.space/dora_and_boots_best_friends_forever5uxg4.pdf
    • http://banepudota.iblogger.org/the_adventures_of_huck_finn_disney_movie.pdf
    • http://komarovskii.xyz/deadpool_full_movie_in_telugu_movierulzekhyx.pdf
    • https://veselamo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452803/ganiruwufatave-logajegejex-xazufekunij-panip.pdf
    • http://sale-siberian-force.online/pegunokalimivugefagibuzuux4tz.pdf
    • https://sarajigirokoxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135300612/a3b9983fa92.pdf
    • http://pipabineki.22web.org/selenium_testng_tutorial_guru99.pdf
    • http://fishland.store/japafuxixudakogibb1f5n.pdf
    • http://hopecommunitynaz.com/2106905773346i6z.pdf
    • https://xavaruren.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383751/65485.pdf
    • https://zagarete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134687236/kivoguroko.pdf
    • https://tusidotug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134482214/niguxepeturena.pdf
    • http://meetdouche.xyz/how_to_read_chords_music_theoryxpnth.pdf
    • http://sportita.fun/xoberuslksz.pdf
    • http://fontawesome.iohttp://fontawesome.io/license/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • http://varidigodi.epizy.com/how_do_i_astrill_in_china.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010261.bin
1fd656506c834efc59fd09e502ca40cd766bfbc9ad4befbee4d0cf9baeb71474
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10261 2084 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010bb7.bin
f86a0ebbf40f05ae6dcde64743751af886c5cd3d207875274b16cc90e15ff924
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10BB7 5532 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011e4e.bin
ee7b264caceaab104dabe837762a8989c9a942c8999e9b83442e06b4cbf78f26
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E4E 11528 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00014585.bin
7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14585 4324 bytes