Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfd7de7d3497dd55…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: bb4da42d11786a394f65ce1cb8d8c446 SHA-1: 7ff3cb3733d04e2c3a2006742c61bc15bd340bd0 SHA-256: dfd7de7d3497dd55ff6920b0b7fb9885eed23f3d8f963c61cf112c3595012e61
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ".objupdate" and the decoded object data strongly indicate that the exploit is designed to activate and execute arbitrary code upon opening the document. This is a common delivery mechanism for initial access.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
da96d9b061eb8e3e00d65aabaf7a00ff43384342909e8eebeb492069e8e77310		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27737 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d2bf.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2BF 478713 bytes

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