Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfbf4cbc74f23c34…

MALICIOUS

PDF

128.3 KB Created: 2021-06-29 23:51:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 3f5562dd9c4612a55be88e440f17abed SHA-1: 04bf5b4d11edb20f7ef91267cdd565771eb1c0a9 SHA-256: dfbf4cbc74f23c34b8f9fa09c2b8330c9a591237d2788a514e3e8c9f4b25829b
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript, which is often used to download and execute additional malicious content. Heuristics indicate a fake invoice or payment lure combined with a visual download button, suggesting a phishing or scam attempt. The presence of multiple links to compromised WordPress upload directories further supports the malicious intent, likely serving as a distribution point for further stages.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9957

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.cocochan.com.pk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f4a5bc5cfbe6884e3207f626599eadec/mujofomepoferopurikudo.pdf
    • https://profbuhotchet.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4bbd60a526671bf3e9533eb986e3212c/11083400090.pdf
    • http://luingpyrex.cz/foto/Image/file/borobadepedixaw.pdf
    • https://janeunchained.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5hv5ormt109l1hanp51jeiksqi/dotalazugejava.pdf
    • https://www.djluk.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l2vmgiotil5jgtd4a958r34vng/wagorejav.pdf
    • https://www.certificagreen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cba5ad4f972---33398728382.pdf
    • http://dodici12.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q1p49rl0309rirehfgf7q3k0s7/75768788784.pdf
    • http://adria-ex.com/images/blog//file/zoguruwunawikojexol.pdf
    • https://angelsstaff.com/uploads/file/dibarudiredigupele.pdf
    • http://juha.be/_files/file/25070876032.pdf
    • http://alliance-ltd.com/userfiles/geturatinizixomabexapop.pdf
    • https://kfz-gutachter-oliver-schiller.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f29597081d---81173421088.pdf
    • https://akdenizokullari.k12.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/li9kb6acten3dkqubkjdi8rh66/64073150842.pdf
    • https://vickers-electronics.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/db82a4f59a001eb433524da262a15a8f/92816406789.pdf
    • https://lawpropertyconsultants.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/gev35kse6h51onsf8ace9j21tj/52267165957.pdf
    • http://altaprecision.com/userfiles/file/72158638020.pdf
    • http://erkerlaender.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093fb8a51a8d---29234739142.pdf
    • https://i-chat.tw/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sesazagam.pdf
    • http://argol-editions.fr/userfiles/file/zixijik.pdf
    • https://amrapalispot.com/userfiles/file/jarakoned.pdf
    • https://monyetjoget.com/contents//files/12711665922.pdf
    • https://asaptransfers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bl3m2rin2fgpoqldgi98q32374/mekujoladigoxu.pdf
    • http://naturallabs.fr/userfiles/file/vivugij.pdf
    • https://clumba-indoor.ru/files/files/lobirupipuluzuwoj.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=h2s+final+exam+answers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000193b7.bin
9f0c6f10c9dba13cd7a587358945915e9200ec3fbd916e5dea59a968c2e06757		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x193B7 10456 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001ab6f.bin
63ac98a6cc325a6351042435a1b6af0d67628d134e04d1104fd422f3713079bd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1AB6F 18224 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001dbd9.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DBD9 16792 bytes

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