Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfb71918afa99343…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-06-30 11:09:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 17cc16466a0dc1053331acf3bf0cb968 SHA-1: cd91dc65c4459431e4ab7e0f4ae2705aec314485 SHA-256: dfb71918afa99343374793f2a86039ad0a39f232110fdc9d212f59f05e9c92e5
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The presence of embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites and link farms, suggests an attempt to redirect users to malicious content or download further payloads. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' strongly indicates the document's purpose is to trick users into believing they need to open a password-protected archive, a common social engineering tactic to bypass gateway security.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9958

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://zs-g.jp/app/webroot/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/musiziz.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://alteanetworks.fr/img/file/kutetosuzatolunamalikupex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://deeringbayrealestate.com/userfiles/files/vexikas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://protech.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4deebcae52---xudupijot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://faprosid.com/file/94659337654.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tcufroghouses.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d9a375dca8---mulesuvesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://caribsplash.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2ea74c08c6---75004339509.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.training4thefuture.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160700c7a0e036---23076615603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://emmaushuis.org/pages/58632323265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gulertrafik.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d0eujafqbu3cjosfe5dsqk08va/94756939162.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://belhasasecurity.com/userfiles/file/faxep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://avantkart.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bue0j05r6da5kjbmd5s383kk1r/jexowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lightupalife.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080b1738534c---1814918386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mkting.com.co/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/247117e02ad21cdd1c9207ffaf838f97/35153155102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://electrabicycles.pl/app/webroot/uploads/file/16211107008345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.peopleoftheheath.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096d16200a18---2725959428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amphorabeautyclub.com/campannas/file/37220080441.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daydreamspin.com/userfiles/file/41334924947.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://111-orte.de/testarea/cwsCMSlight/media/files/94871247685.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gfow.om/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tcmdk2vl0vd8aq8m3hn6v8ubma/65116905765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vladjurnalist.ru/archive/file/kobonemenixuzutaras.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.caribbeandentist.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f2c256727a---bopopudufogax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cafe-malaysia.com/contents/file/75221857498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vladjurnaliIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=300+square+meter+to+feetPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d477.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD477 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec89.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC89 16512 bytes
SHA-256: e8e0e3dfee2cfbf05a6df4f83bb862d0e935fbb6babf0df5efb84b05c1c113c1
font_02_sfnt_off00011769.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11769 10576 bytes
SHA-256: e660dbbe46959efdcd76babe9bbcccd2cfac3cc1cc5dd77d6a87f66fee8d61d2

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