PDF malware analysis — malicious · dfaf336508cda33a

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.1 KB Created: 2010-08-01 04:20:19 Authoring application: daceWis muleDoc

MD5: e70e450459fdf9e477807e006df32318 SHA-1: 3076dbad2cd6595a9047f4567ecb7fde0d944152 SHA-256: dfaf336508cda33af4fb8941d45731cac0da2da737a9c675c91e9b4039ce869c

128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload and exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to LibTIFF XFA image parsing. This indicates the document is designed to deliver a malicious payload upon opening. The ML classifier strongly supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188

PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0015.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0x2CA	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x37C	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0013.bin` `064adb021e0ec4a3476e36a1a6071ccb387df4055352d8a78593b1b22fa41fe1`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x46D	1131 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x730	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `1e14cdb10ab0d556a780ed05315744733b0e1cb1acb23d509ca186e767551ceb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x823	54876 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x15F0	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x1696	56 bytes

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