Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dfae88da49ab8e4d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.26 MB
MD5: 0151217566248dbf444cb9e0d41aaebc SHA-1: 8a42275ed41f878500e4f0834c5e03b81b7545f1 SHA-256: dfae88da49ab8e4d80b46bb9682b195dfd018c97e8e9ee63aedaaee5c64bbbd0
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit carrier. This strongly suggests it is designed to exploit a known vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute arbitrary code. No document body text or scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the specific payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.