Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df84048eb7df085c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.59 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-26
MD5: 78fb4b695c7beb09d3e5df8e39283995 SHA-1: 01f1b42af65073225267f31266553a8247332a88 SHA-256: df84048eb7df085ca8bd8aa8beda2f96abb7e9fe647e4e10bc04a542fddb463c
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object. Static analysis identified a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE, indicating exploitation of this known vulnerability. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, suggesting the exploit payload is delivered via the OLE object itself. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
13df64a57bf32ae8041ae6ba45231358b4a8a771dd46a59eb9a0dd83945d0db4
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01DB452C/olE10NativE 1489 bytes