Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Heuristics 12

• Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
  Shell() call in VBA
• Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
  VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
• AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
  AutoOpen macro
• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
  Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
• Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACON
  Document references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
• External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
  External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: http://webhook.site/d63049e3-1cbe-474b-9005-237517af53a7/docopened.jpg
• Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
  Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
• Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
  Environ() call (env variable access)
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://webhook.site/d63049e3-1cbe-474b-9005-237517af53a7/docopened.jpg

  • https://webhook.site/5dbed3be-f1c9-41e5-b5d5-e961d08b5fba
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16du
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlock
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task^

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