Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df41abdb7873043f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.6 KB Created: 2020-04-09 17:28:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 2ab3b814564fce53c50c3dcbe201a046 SHA-1: 015fcc91deba3ebf7598b3f79e19411fc29ff9c3 SHA-256: df41abdb7873043fd2ca0a8040251037f801a35dd27ac6333b734e2877969afe
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document was flagged by an ML classifier as malicious. It contains a large number of external links, many of which point to similarly structured URLs on various domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The document body is heavily obfuscated and contains embedded URLs, further supporting the malicious intent. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://goodchiroaz.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606493/131606493.html#lesson+plan+dictionary
    • http://merryvillemuseum.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323211/niwutikuxupaja.pdf
    • http://labs.kiwi/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437667/3976937.pdf
    • http://sacblackbiz.org/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590117/4279041.pdf
    • http://nancyhamiltonmyers.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590594/perinadeniwaw.pdf
    • http://newvisionshomerepair.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776776/jemitis.pdf
    • http://tjwhitford.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130546574/5887684.pdf
    • http://sarahschaal.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639153/37763a7f8d20d.pdf
    • http://bettys-tesalong.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455198/8b1d98142176783.pdf
    • http://mitchellgribbroek.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407709/wepivozogizavowebit.pdf
    • http://greeniequeenie.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130640200/mutixatajobiwa-vifun.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006506.bin
b600802a9627b066c13b2adc3ad7a13b9b10fa99c4d553a9ea7b14ae291f2bd4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6506 8516 bytes