Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df3336b096531a23…

MALICIOUS

RTF

294.4 KB First seen: 2018-11-05
MD5: 88262b49d2b1c6601e40a37c8007a1e5 SHA-1: f5d800177a5cbf26ad05596ac855f37691782fb0 SHA-256: df3336b096531a23f3a67dadb2a228e43b4ca9babc42c3d711689ce79aa63c98
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, triggering exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the loading of a remote payload via the OLE moniker stream, indicating the file's primary purpose is to execute a second-stage malicious component. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000001b0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B0 3125 bytes
SHA-256: b5d22357144e3a46955560ccb16fcc5db0957e2a731e332e3581a007abdb0723