Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df2aed99cff8a2b7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.2 KB Created: 2021-09-08 04:01:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 75ee5595fccad7c91694aabb6800f8ff SHA-1: 90a629bdb6d9c13b72bb4a91389f9e8e21ad1967 SHA-256: df2aed99cff8a2b796056ca14edfd9d8408417cb6f8ef6df3f23ef13913f7883
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to potentially compromised websites or directly to IP addresses, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' and the ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent. The presence of multiple PDF_URI heuristics and the compromised CMS upload link farm heuristic further support the phishing and redirection attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9961

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.chesapeake-lighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ea6f5d387ec39e0a9d07894580d06a52/19004831642.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://nacyc.jp/Upload/file/talakovasifuguzipusiwis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://157.230.241.115/image/upload/File/85354507834.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://himalayanwanderer.com/himalayan/userfiles/files/54891741837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://adams-gold.ru/archive/image/file/18749056551.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bochosushi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac18df2f451---15051416066.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lookupagency.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b46a4b17d1c---pudibimolezukag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resortweeks.pro/userfiles/file/vinuminebevavawasekozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mclarenpress.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161111a9ae7a28---bigeriluzebibuline.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.areatransfers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8d9e55c8ac---nofepom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://argyleliquidations.com/userfiles/files/fesonotabiredowadigegegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jarosi.hu/files/file/pegunexegazud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.afamaresme.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087b72acc069---xaxinurezujazilorupumes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gldbirdgel.com/user_img/files/34863853265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goldcoil.com/uploadfiles/files/50274657510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxikladis.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c7b530c54dd---70523855434.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://virtrade.gr/userfiles_lybo/file/58738552820.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://diversifiedhumansolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/05b417a2b39abd0bbb0415807ef4fc54/12434377420.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tktravelkorea.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210730_3940FE147BDFF9ED.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thejinglelab.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c5dsco3ffgsm43qadu6d01fbs9/digiwujazowoxubovusaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ourpreferred.com/userfiles/files/jexawejatadetid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://msiutilities.biz/documents/13256136420.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cgt-fo-csc.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160780130e97fc---zubifilikitor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://strategieb2b.ca/userfiles/file/rubem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lokalesichtbarkeit.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ateo460hl04kg4liuqkaplo40/kazomed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=jane+eyre+chapter+15+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00012350.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12350 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00013b62.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13B62 18356 bytes
SHA-256: bab31d958a74627124ae5f22072053f764290c0be171bbf9d49324e6830fe46f
font_02_sfnt_off00016ad5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16AD5 10584 bytes
SHA-256: 717f258f80d3c851605d53af24dacd53ceef99546f56114ba4c5fe8970731b8d

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.