Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df234a86fd165407…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.3 KB Created: 2020-12-28 09:23:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 2bdc58bd8b03e5d8d573cca2c8007971 SHA-1: 1df5e88623f8ebc206c461f30696a4ac1503b3be SHA-256: df234a86fd165407899854c3f18fc491a919b40e2817e58b1748522fa7de74ad
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to direct users to potentially malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with techniques used to deliver second-stage payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/aws?utm_term=common+english+words+with+tamil+meanings+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jajotulix/ehgl8cO/vibab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dakufosaxem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134771611/woxuzupitojaro_gekuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jusujonolixutuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379247/ripibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xinovupu/jcU43jh/exothermic_and_endothermic_examples.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nopawuwam/jDdIAha/clear_guard_transparent_film_screen_protector.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kozenuxifojani.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134665776/zuxifofepazovop-rimokafabar-wukagetoxas-zivamuvorut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tetatelarusekal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134880277/vogowifovu_bijegufitovap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gunobapeve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134706327/fcd567111de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zazetafulunemu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134599809/girugedowoxupi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tamilavijunaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506647/bowufeveku_kilegezejuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jukuxalubena.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453985/xuxesezerumemudi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pozuwifofub/1jhVj2Z/95151125887.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/palikuvexake/rukojun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jeromopelurab/12701482699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f298.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF298 5356 bytes
SHA-256: ad3d4d6ad1cccd678c6e5277f9a88ded30412e5711851bcfec449a94c03ea512
font_01_sfnt_off000104b2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104B2 10980 bytes
SHA-256: 7a3161d36a2b805bcac312baee84623b3eb0d52fda25123a7660e88548278a9f
font_02_sfnt_off000129d6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x129D6 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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