Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df0b8aada8689e26…

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.7 KB First seen: 2022-12-27
MD5: 8484b99cd26fd3334835b2847ca23eeb SHA-1: 40ec623fedfd0cbb87eb68cdb57c529d3cb58168 SHA-256: df0b8aada8689e26972014602415cf66cdad448349df3e4fb7e3ce434efddad7
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an \objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view or edit the document, which is a common technique for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security settings and trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000590e.bin
059755c4964a5eae7013c65ddb67152ea3b6ba3f277365e423b5f698d84a78bb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x590E 1647 bytes

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