Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df0b7f0494a6e4a8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.7 KB Created: 2021-03-01 17:47:07 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 40e94282a33f1ca39f85c9e9861780d6 SHA-1: 7f721565e840399e081ac693d33cdfe93c741afd SHA-256: df0b7f0494a6e4a89c14f12bbdfb2687b38f9b45218017310c0369d7d375efbc
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing and trojan delivery mechanism. The 'SE_CLICKFIX' heuristic indicates social engineering to trick users into running commands, likely to download a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'wkhtmltopdf' and a prompt about screen capture shortcuts, aligning with the attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/strik?utm_term=what+is+the+shortcut+for+screen+capture PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ronofumito/erjgS3C/josimewazelixiwuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ragejeli/jgarZha/xuzobewaragar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vezadawebowa.iblogger.org/33363102184.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xopuwomu/ShaHhcp/beat_street_soundtrack_cd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mewajofoguwuz.iblogger.org/gufumerawezufatix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tanijosek.22web.org/122327585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gonolesuzam/ehfa7ia/1806338915.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/leredupodeka/e5Jkiav/extreme_landings_pro_mod_apk_free_download_pc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://dupikupujetilu.rf.gd/percy_jackson_book_3_weebly.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wadoromutisagar.myartsonline.com/34224026751.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mabibetajekujap.rf.gd/xepevegog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kefuvazaleneze.rf.gd/app_store_badge_deutsch.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nopatiget.epizy.com/android_hdmi_stick_fr_tv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/simujix/terawidalorezafulara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xalanijowule.rf.gd/sasilafiwotexavaxaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zirutabu.myartsonline.com/poliwirevoxar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e98a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE98A 4968 bytes
SHA-256: 8551776d481487c8a7f3b6142442bf666ce0010b0a229598ec52fc1a778908fe
font_01_sfnt_off0000fa71.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA71 10740 bytes
SHA-256: dd33c0fee60ee1899561f5528cf694787b871a19f94be015551598426674eb58
font_02_sfnt_off00011f36.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F36 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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