Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 df05acc69c93ed9a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.9 KB Created: 2020-10-25 10:34:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c473d7969e8d5af8608509e555ba8230 SHA-1: ba0d2083e7ed8a7dc7a48049a278b3be6e22fcfd SHA-256: df05acc69c93ed9a47a4c69bb1b51da5fa951f41bca2c8b586b59a81ad813ec7
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a link to a redirector, identified by the 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' heuristic, which leads to a URL containing 'xiaomi+mi+9+se+update+android+10'. The 'SE_MFA_LURE' heuristic indicates the document is designed to harvest credentials or session tokens by impersonating an MFA prompt. The presence of numerous external links, as flagged by 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM', suggests a link farm used for SEO poisoning or to distribute malicious content. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/123?keyword=xiaomi+mi+9+se+update+android+10
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382790/normal_5f92ca298ed37.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381738/normal_5f8b497f6392c.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388060/normal_5f8d11b8e09ad.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373788/normal_5f88cdbe6b814.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368751/normal_5f88d047efe6c.pdf
    • https://lagukekejase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130815031/demoxijifiw.pdf
    • https://retinagarar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319249/gazujujij.pdf
    • https://jikolugoxolij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379047/1475678.pdf
    • https://kubupukadumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382740/gafabiviwiz-mijowig-zabesoretos-fegubug.pdf
    • https://nanorobudilason.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775181/zafaginega-pukaxu.pdf
    • https://dabagurujor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134350609/391301.pdf
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/winepogor.pdf
    • https://xanodupujariris.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969381/sadokuxarezug.pdf
    • https://gevafitasib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380901/c25f730.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/0201/5139/files/xedulifuzitepibukitu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0397/9332/8315/files/ayyubids_mamluks_and_crusaders.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/7934/3527/files/33485072297.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tetazino/majusizasurale.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nitatotol/aleksandr_dugin_books.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tetazino/kavekanejefemoxi.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wilugugo/financial_accounting_and_management_notes.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/padadutiseni/biennale_cinema_programma.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000719a.bin
4cec09e25f6192fb50f0a13eba3757028e02a73b31bea3ff2bf26db6522b58c9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x719A 5284 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008370.bin
981b4e97a8f472d0323497d4028cf1e4d0539dae1263776efa767d480236d201		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8370 11108 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a7e4.bin
05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA7E4 4324 bytes

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