Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 deb7169af0ffe58c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.16 MB Created: 2021-06-21 12:15:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: f9b01bf6a7a2c7c26d567fa5dfb9c0e9 SHA-1: 870079150cdf938c07cd5add55957386012b87fb SHA-256: deb7169af0ffe58ccc5185dfe3bbe4e97f9577a8cfc02bc094fc386c5c11a8fe
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, specifically instructing the user to interact with a remote support tool and hinting at a password-protected archive. This suggests an attempt to trick the user into downloading and opening a malicious payload. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of multiple links to potentially compromised CMS upload directories and the ClamAV detection indicate a high likelihood of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0866

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators medium PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://yuha.be/_files/file/jiwawebosowaziliwal.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://siphouse96.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bab4f0583e36ca0ccf780658f7ceceb3/69816022147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kimbuunguyen.com/uploads/userfiles/file/61788242057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://russkiivopros.com/images/FCKeditor/file/87579808608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sahamit.net/userfiles/file/jufupovavokip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--2-140-swe8h.xn--p1ai/files/vafedezinujivuvurudam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agilitynd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f5b94694b5cb3cbce6a1f28702d7e746/zamoviw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iaestedresden.de/userfiles/file/nexiluriwakanam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bringem.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/531662a3c60ee8f2abda4698cf1e5b47/55690341661.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://synerfreight.com/syner_upload/images/files/neduj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alphacleanwashing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0b3f9d94b98ad08d710db21a5e305357/bibinefepozapopakovawena.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://manufim.co.il/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bcbfdfd5c50---55008601145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travolution.travel/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e9ee5047bfb34e6e6e4190d486fb33d0/15197224740.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=kami+hacked+client+minecraftPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00124ac5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124AC5 5116 bytes
SHA-256: bbf0d226a64e9c4604ed1ae5744cd200c575290d06a8c462d986201200c64eb7
font_01_sfnt_off00125c0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x125C0A 9428 bytes
SHA-256: 7dddf9b8c8e16e8c074f867a5fc2f87d2fd904b0e8aafd1d5e55f8169b9eb198