PDF malware analysis — malicious · deaee2007c3b0a38

MALICIOUS

PDF

8.2 KB

MD5: 82b45d7a4fcd5c1ae260292327f6d176 SHA-1: 048710e0f01545a7901c55b7eb49d2e28f74acee SHA-256: deaee2007c3b0a387e89dbb13ea6650a27e9913780f7b16e6aece4eb3c7df529

166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains obfuscated JavaScript, identified as a multi-stage dropper. Heuristics indicate that it attempts to decode and execute further stages, likely downloading a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086' further confirms its malicious nature. The presence of JavaScript actions and embedded JS streams points to T1059.005 (Visual Basic) and T1059.001 (PowerShell) as likely execution vectors for the dropped payload.

Heuristics 7

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER

PDF JavaScript shows 3 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0006_000.js` `f9b4659beaf681d266cfb5046d495e7b144d406eff72e71ecd4d1451ae25ca11`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x143	481 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js` `22e2654e25c87e1fa3eec57da230911215a7341c35507b966e01e152ced51bfe`	deobfuscated-js	repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1B3E	1878 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `04f9533edf0d0e7000642db752d704867c9df0dc38161723d5a7afc9c8f7027a`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	23763 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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